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Although a large contingency of theory and research has been conducted in the area of individual and interpersonal communication, relatively few theoreticians have focused on the broader character of communication at the organizational level of analysis. With the increasing emphases on total quality, leadership, adaptive cultures, process reengineering, and other organizational change and development efforts, however, the need to understand the process and function of organizational communication at a broader, more systemic level is paramount. The following paper attempts to address this issue by providing: (1) a comparative review and critique of three “classic” theoretical approaches to describing the importance of communication in organizations and the relationship between communication and organizational functioning (open systems theory, the information‐processing perspective, and the communication as culture framework); and (2) a new integrative framework—the CPR model of organizational communication—for conceptualizing and understanding the nature of communication in organizations based on constructs adapted from these three perspectives. The model is then used both in an applied example to help diagnose an organizational system and to stimulate suggestions for future research.

The purpose of this paper is to summarize record‐keeping requirements for Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)‐registered advisers of private investment companies, especially hedge funds.

Summarizes the important record‐keeping provisions of Rule 204‐2 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the Advisers Act) in categories including accounting records; records of orders to purchase and sell securities; written communications; documents supporting performance information; lists of discretionary accounts; powers of attorney; written contracts; codes of ethics; personal securities transactions; disclosure documents; client solicitation agreements; written policies and procedures; records for advisers with custody; investment supervisory or management services; proxy voting records; coded designation for certain clients; the time, place, and manner for retention of records; records for advisers exiting the business; duplicate records; records for nonresident advisers; records for advisers previously registered with a state; and hedge fund records.

Pursuant to new Rule 203(b)(3)‐2 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), most advisers of private investment companies, especially hedge funds, will be required to register with the SEC as investment advisers. Registered investment advisers must comply with the rules and regulations of the Advisers Act, including the recordkeeping requirements of Rule 204‐2 under the Advisers Act. Although the subject of recordkeeping is perhaps unexciting, recordkeeping is a key area of regulatory focus for the SEC and its examiners, particularly as they seek to gauge the adequacy of adviser compliance and internal controls.

A useful summary of record‐keeping requirements for hedge funds and other private investment companies.

This paper reviews and analyzes the literature on agency theory in terms of the nature of the problem and its implications for management. Finance theory posits that the goal of economic organizations is to maximize stockholders' wealth. Attaining this goal was not an issue when owners were also managers. But since World War II corporate ownership world‐wide has become increasingly diffused. By 1969 only 15% of the largest U.S. non‐financial institutions were owned by their managers. This change raises the issue of the relationships between owners and managers. To what extent do managers act on their own behalf rather than the owners as prescribed by finance theory? Several studies indicate that managers substitute their own interests in place of the shareholders. This is possible because managers possess more information about the firm, control the election procedure to the Board of Directors, and the shareholders are widely dispersed. This phenomenon is called an agency problem. According to Jensen and Meckling an “agency problem” exists when managers own less than 100% of the firm. With less than 100 per cent ownership, managers can shift part of the cost associated with decisions made in their own interest. Clearly these conditions are common in major corporations of the world where global markets require raising large amounts of capital for the research, development, and production facilities required to remain competitive.

In this paper, I demonstrate an alternative explanation to the development of the American electricity industry. I propose a social embeddedness approach (Granovetter, 1985, 1992) to interpret why the American electricity industry appears the way it does today, and start by addressing the following questions: Why is the generating dynamo located in well‐connected central stations rather than in isolated stations? Why does not every manufacturing firm, hospital, school, or even household operate its own generating equipment? Why do we use incandescent lamps rather than arc lamps or gas lamps for lighting? At the end of the nineteenth century, the first era of the electricity industry, all these technical as well as organizational forms were indeed possible alternatives. The centralized systems we see today comprise integrated, urban, central station firms which produce and sell electricity to users within a monopolized territory. Yet there were visions of a more decentralized electricity industry. For instance, a geographically decentralized system might have dispersed small systems based around an isolated or neighborhood generating dynamo; or a functionally decentralized system which included firms solely generating and transmitting the power, and selling the power to locally‐owned distribution firms (McGuire, Granovetter, and Schwartz, forthcoming). Similarly, the incandescent lamp was not the only illuminating device available at that time. The arc lamp was more suitable for large‐space lighting than incandescent lamps; and the second‐generation gas lamp ‐ Welsbach mantle lamp ‐ was much cheaper than the incandescent electric light and nearly as good in quality (Passer, 1953:196–197).

Using an instant response device within the context of a controlled experiment, we find that people’s self‐assessment of susceptibility to normative influence (SNI) differs substantially from the actual, or true, degree to which they are influenced by the actions of others. Actual SNI, a subconscious reaction to the behavior of those around us, can be altered when participants (falsely) believe their peers differ in their willingness to sign a new lease under various rental reduction incentives when their landlord has defaulted on his mortgage. The results are insensitive to eight alternative measures of actual SNI. This study supports the behavioral finance literature relating to herding in that we show people are very much willing to follow the lead of their peers, even in situations where information gain is not the likely derived benefit. Instead, people appear to herd in our study for social reasons.

This issue is a selected bibliography covering the subject of leadership.

Little research has explored individual experiences of cyberbullying in working contexts. To start bridging the gap in our current understanding, we used Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) to explore individuals' shared experiences of cyberbullying encountered through work. In-depth interviews, conducted with five cyberbullied workers from the pharmaceutical, charity and university sectors, resulted in five superordinate themes: attributions of causality; crossing of boundaries; influence of communication media richness on relationship development; influence of communication explicitness and openness; and strategies for coping. Overall, some similarities emerged between cyberbullying experiences and traditional bullying research, yet the complexities associated with managing relationships, both virtually and physically, were central to individuals' subjective experiences. Practical implications in developing effective leadership and business policies to support virtual groups and manage behaviours are discussed.